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1 Introduction
Do men and women behave differently in competitive situations? Recent research suggests
the average woman to be reluctant to compete (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011) and generally differ in their attitude towards competitive
situations (Byrnes et al., 1999; Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015). Especially when trying to explain the
persistent gender wage gap – which is not expected to be closed for another 70 years (Topping,
2015) – noncognitive skills and attitudes are proving to be important factors (Grove et al., 2011).1
However, most studies analyzing potential gender differences in competitive situations suffer
from identification problems or lack information on other, potentially crucial characteristics.
For instance, in most labor markets women work alongside men throughout their entire career
and training, which makes it difficult to isolate performance measurements and disentangle
behavior in the workplace from the influence of male colleagues.
Recently, labor markets in the sports world have become prominent laboratories for testing
behavior in competitive situations. Reasons include the clear observability of outcomes (winning
or losing) and a rich set of control and background information that is not normally available
in business world environments (Kahn, 2000). Tennis as a single sport provides an ideal testing
ground in this context, as professional tours are separated by gender, yet prize money has been
very comparable in the past and has recently been equalized in the biggest events (also see
Wozniak, 2012).
This paper uses all tennis matches on the main tours of every male and female tennis player
who was ranked in September 2014 to analyze two major phenomena of the labor and sports
economics literature: the hot-hand and clutch-player effects. The hot-hand effect states that
recent, strong performances may affect current outcomes, whereas the clutch-player effect argues
performance to increase when stakes are higher. Overall, our sample includes 107,566 tennis
matches of 853 professional tennis players (424 males and 429 females). Taking advantage of
a rich set of available control variables, our results contribute to three distinct branches of the
economics literature.
First, we find strong evidence for the hot-hand effect. Even after controlling for rankings
1Other important aspects include historical origins and societal norms (Alesina et al., 2013; Burda et al., 2013),
as well as socialization in early childhood (Andersen et al., 2013).
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(linear and squared), head-to-head characteristics of both players, and tournament-specific as-
pects, previously won matches are a positive and statistically meaningful predictor of winning
the current match. In our most complete estimation, the marginal effect of having one addi-
tional winning encounter in the last ten matches raises the probability of winning by 3.1 to 3.3
percentage points. These results are in contrast to earlier findings by Gilovich et al. (1985) and
further extend works by Abrevaya (2002), Livingston (2012), and Wozniak (2012).2
Second, the clutch-player effect emerges with force: top players perform their best in Grand
Slam tournaments, arguably the most important dates of the tennis calendar. This confirms
traditional theories of larger payoffs increasing incentives and therefore efforts (Lazear, 2000).
Third, we find virtually no gender differences for the hot-hand phenomenon and only very
minor differences for the clutch-player effect. Both in terms of statistical importance and magni-
tudes, both men and women show evidence for the hot-hand effect in professional tennis matches.
Regarding the clutch-player phenomenon, female top players actually appear more likely to com-
pete well on big stages, although the effect is statistically meaningful for either gender. Only
when looking at in-match performances do we find nuanced gender differences: top male players
are more likely to win a tie-break when it matters most, whereas the respective result for the
female sample remains statistically irrelevant.
These results are surprising given recent findings on gender differences in competitive en-
vironments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Niederle, 2014). A
possible explanation could be the isolated, single-sex structure of tennis as a professional sport,
as opposed to competing in mixed labor markets (see Gneezy et al., 2003). Thus, women may
be as competitive as men when competing amongst themselves.
2 Data
Our sample data consists of all career matches of male and female tennis players who on Septem-
ber 21, 2014, were listed on the respective world rankings (ATP Tour for the men, WTA Tour
for the women). Specifically, we focus on main ATP and WTA Tour matches, excluding tourna-
2Other studies analyze the hot-hand effect in the context of gambling, such as Croson and Sundali (2005)
and Rabin and Vayanos (2010). Our approach is different as we are analyzing a skill-based sport, as opposed to
gambling.
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ments on the minor Challengers and Futures Tours for lack of detailed data. On the ATP Tour
this produces a total of 57,133 matches by 424 players, whereas the WTA sample includes 50,433
encounters and 429 players.3 In order to test for the hot-hand phenomenon and allow for the
creation of variables capturing previous performance, we only use observations (i.e., matches)
where the respective player has at least played ten previous matches on the respective Tour
(ATP or WTA).
In addition to the large and comprehensive size of our sample a major advantage can be
found in the rich set of control variables that the professional tennis organizations are offering
for every match. In this context, Livingston (2012) points out that the hot-hand effect may
have been masked by a lack of relevant control variables in previous studies. Our data includes
rankings of both participating players, head-to-head histories, tournament specifics (tournament
type, round, surface), and nationalities. Table 1 displays our summary statistics, comparing each
variable between the male and female Tours. It is interesting to see that, besides the number
of matches won and losing streaks, all variables show substantial differences across the male
and female Tours. This further highlights the importance of incorporating meaningful control
variables when estimating behavior in competitive environments, such as the hot-hand or the
clutch-player effects.
Notice that 53 to 54 percent of all matches were won by the reference player, indicating that
a number of players who lost matches are not playing professional tennis tournaments anymore.
In general, if both participating players of a match are ranked at the time of data collection the
match enters our sample twice: once from the respective player’s perspective and once from the
opponent’s perspective (similar to the data structure in Duggan and Levitt, 2002). In terms of
our main variables of interest, women have won more of their previous ten matches and enjoy
longer winning streaks on average. Further, on the WTA Tour players are more likely to have
faced each other before (16 percent of matches are first-time encounters), suggesting a smaller
turnaround of players over time. Further, the average female player is substantially younger
3The earliest match in our male sample took place in March 1997, whereas the first match of the female sample
dates back to May 1989. The reason for such an early match in the female sample can be traced back to Kimiko
Date-Krumm (from Japan, born 1970), who returned to professional tennis at the age of 37 in April 2008 and is
still playing today at the age of 43. The last match in both samples comes from the week before our data collection
(September 21, 2014). All data are derived from the ATP and WTA websites (http://www.atpworldtour.com/
and http://www.wtatennis.com/).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean ATP Mean WTA T-test ATP=WTA
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (p-value)
Winning match 0.53 0.54 0.23
(0.50) (0.50)
# of wins in last 10 matches 5.35 5.43 0.00∗∗∗
(1.78) (1.79)
Ranking 94.03 95.67 0.00∗∗∗
(99.54) (87.80)
Opponent’s ranking 126.04 115.42 0.00∗∗∗
(184.92) (132.45)
Never faced opponent before 0.18 0.16 0.00∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.36)
Never beaten opponent 0.46 0.56 0.00∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.50)
From same country 0.07 0.06 0.00∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.23)
Grand Slam 0.22 0.21 0.00∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.41)
# of wins in last 5 matches 2.68 2.71 0.00∗∗∗
(1.13) (1.14)
Winning streak (max. 10 matches) 1.15 1.17 0.07∗
(1.68) (1.65)
Losing streak (max. 10 matches) 0.87 0.86 0.18
(1.35) (1.35)
Age in years 25.5 21.98 0.00∗∗∗
(3.45) (4.36)
Experience on Tour in years 6.02 7.05 0.00∗∗∗
(3.15) (3.81)
Observations 57,133 50,433
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than the average male player, although the reverse is true when considering experience (time
since first professional match in years). This highlights the fact that girls enter the professional
tennis arena much earlier than boys (Guillaume et al., 2011).
3 Methodology
Given the data described in Table 1, we test professional tennis matches for two main phenomena
that have drawn attention in the associated labor and sports literatures: the hot-hand and the
clutch-player effects. The former effect states that when an athlete is “hot” (cold), meaning
that she has performed well (badly) in immediately preceding competitions, her likelihood of
performing well increases (decreases). Some research has found affirmative (Abrevaya, 2002, for
bowling; Livingston, 2012, for golf; Wozniak, 2012, for tennis) and others contradictive evidence
for the hot-hand effect (Gilovich et al., 1985, for basketball; Bar-Eli et al., 2006, in general).
The latter argument focuses on the size of the payoff at stake, putting workers under increased
pressure (Dohmen, 2008; Ariely et al., 2009). Previous literature has suggested and presented
evidence for two contradicting hypotheses in this context. For once, very large payoffs can lead
to mistakes (Ariely et al., 2009; Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010), but may also increase
effort levels (Lazear, 2000).
To test both phenomena, we employ conventional logit regressions, estimating the likelihood
of a player winning a tennis match. For the hot-hand effect, we construct several versions of the
main independent variable. First, we incorporate a variable measuring the number of wins in
the last ten matches of the respective player. If the derived coefficient then takes on a positive
and statistically meaningful value, this would provide evidence for the existence of the hot-hand
effect. Notice that in every tennis tournament only one player eventually remains unbeaten,
whereas all other players (31 in a draw of 32; 63 in a draw of 64) suffer a loss. Thus, using
the number of wins in the past ten matches provides a more lenient definition of the hot-hand
phenomenon. Nevertheless, section 4.2 provides results from incorporating pure, uninterrupted
winning and losing streaks. In addition, we control for other factors that are likely to affect
the probability of a victorious outcome, namely the current ranking (linear and squared), the
opponent’s ranking, head-to-head information (whether both players played against each other
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before, whether the opponent was beaten at least once before, whether both players originate
from the same country), and match specifics (fixed effects for tournament category, round, and
surface).4
Our strategy for testing the clutch-player effect then builds on this framework by incorporat-
ing an interaction term between a player’s ranking and the importance of the respective match.
Clearly, the four Grand Slam tournaments stand out on both the ATP and the WTA Tours: the
Australian Open, French Open, Wimbledon, and the US Open. Both in terms of prize money
and prestige, these events mark the highlights of the tennis calendar. Table 2 visualizes the
extraordinary importance of the four Grand Slam tournaments, as indicated by prize money.
In addition, we then analyze crucial situations within a match, namely whether top players are
more likely to prevail in decisive sets and tie-breaks when playing at Grand Slam events.
Table 2: Total prize money for the ten biggest tournaments in 2014, all in US$ (exchange rates
taken on March 8, 2015).
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
Tournament Prize money Tournament Prize money
US Open 19,125,880 US Open 19,125,880
Wimbledon 18,800,000 Wimbledon 18,800,000
French Open 13,551,487 French Open 13,551,487
Australian Open 12,715,725 Australian Open 12,715,725
London (Masters) 6,500,000 Singapore (WTA Finals) 6,500,000
Indian Wells 5,240,015 Indian Wells 5,946,740
Miami 4,720,380 Beijing 5,427,105
Shanghai 4,195,895 Miami 5,427,105
Madrid 3,977,233 Madrid 4,942,700
Cincinnati 3,356,715 Wuhan 2,440,070
Toronto 3,146,920 Qatar, Montreal, Cincinnati 2,369,000
In terms of identifying star players, we take several approaches. First, we incorporate a
binary variable for whether a player is ranked in the top four of the rankings. Naturally, the top
ranked four players are always seeded in the tournament bracket in a way that does not allow
4We include binary indicators for tournament types of ATP, WTA, and Grand Slam tournaments. Round
fixed effects include final, semifinal, quarterfinal, round of 16, round of 32, round of 64, round of 128, qualification
rounds, and group stages (Masters). Dummies for surface types are carpet, clay, hard, and grass courts.
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them to meet before the semifinal. On the men’s Tour this list includes (almost exclusively over
the past eight years) Roger Federer, Novak Djokovic, Rafael Nadal, and Andy Murray.5 In fact,
in the ten years from 2004 to 2013 these four players have won 37 of all 40 Grand Slam titles.
On the women’s side, the list is a bit longer, incorporating overall 16 players.6
In order to assess whether top players perform when it matters most, we create an interac-
tion term between players who are ranked in the top four and Grand Slam tournaments. If a
clutch-player effect were to exist in professional tennis, we would expect star players to perform
exceptionally well in the most important events, Grand Slam tournaments. We then also apply a
more continuous measurement of identifying top players by using pure rankings in an interaction
term with Grand Slam matches. Here again, we display several robustness check (e.g., using top
ten or only well-established players on the tour with at least 50 matches).
4 Empirical Findings for the Hot-Hand Phenomenon
Starting with the evaluation of the hot-hand phenomenon, Tables 3 to 7 display our main results
from logit regressions. We first present our baseline findings, before moving to several extensions
and robustness checks. Finally, Section 4.3 considers potential heterogeneities along the lines of
age and experience. Throughout all tables, we usually display the results from the ATP sample
in the first four columns, followed by the WTA sample in columns (5) to (8). All our results are
virtually identical when using a probit model.
4.1 Main Results
Table 3 shows regressions coefficients from estimating the probability to win a match, trying
to isolate the effect of recent performances. Specifically, we start with a univariate regression
using the number of wins out of the last ten matches as a sole predictor. Notice that for both
men and women the coefficient is negative, statistically powerful, and remarkably similar (0.033
5The only other players to break into this elusive group throughout our entire sample period (albeit for
relatively short periods of time) are Nikolay Davydenko, David Ferrer, Tommy Haas, Lleyton Hewitt, Juan
Martin Del Potro, and Stanislas Wawrinka.
6These players are Victoria Azarenka, Eugenie Bouchard, Simona Halep, Ana Ivanovic, Jelena Jankovic, Svet-
lana Kuznetsova, Petra Kvitova, Na Li, Nadia Petrova, Agniezska Radwanska, Francesca Schiavone, Maria Shara-
pova, Serena and Venus Williams, Caroline Wozniacki, and Vera Zvonareva.
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to 0.034). Taken literally, every win in the last ten matches is suggested to raise the chances
of winning the current match by 3.3 to 3.4 percentage points. In the extreme case of having
won all previous ten matches, this effect can become sizeable and increase one’s likelihood of
prevailing victoriously by 33 to 34 percentage points.
However, this univariate regression does not acknowledge the importance of other factors
that can be crucial in predicting a winner. Most notably, current rankings of both players are
probably the most obvious indicators and columns (2) and (6) add these factors to the model.
Notice that we divide all rankings by 100 to facilitate readability of the derived coefficients. As
expected, both a better ranking (a lower number) and a worse ranking of the opponent (a higher
number) raise the chances of winning. Notice also that rankings seem to matter slightly more
on the female Tour, as magnitudes are usually about 30 percentage points higher in columns
(6) through (8). Throughout all our estimations, this finding remains remarkably consistent,
both in terms of statistical relevance and magnitude. Regarding our variable of interest, the
coefficient on the number of past wins drops to 0.28 to 0.29, but comfortably retains its statistical
importance. In additional estimations (available upon request) we also incorporated the average
ranking of past opponents, but the hot-hand effect persists and does not seem to be driven by
whom one has beaten previously.
The final two columns of the male and female sample then include head-to-head charac-
teristics, a dummy for Grand Slam tournaments, but also fixed effects for the specific playing
surfaces (carpet, clay, hard court, and grass) and rounds (final, semifinal, etc.). It is interesting
to see that not having faced an opponent before lowers the odds of winning and so does the fact
of playing at a Grand Slam tournament. The reason for the latter finding can likely be found
in the strong field of participants at Grand Slams, where the cutoff for participation is usually
around #104 in a field of 128 players.7 Thus, very few low ranked players participate, making
it more difficult to advance.
In general, the estimated coefficients conform to our initial intuition and we find a robust
relationship between the number of wins in the recent past and the odds of winning the current
encounter. Not only is the effect strong in statistical terms, but also remains sizeable when
adding the mentioned list of control variables. In fact, the coefficient only decreases marginally
7The remaining spots are allocated through a qualifying tournament and “Wild Cards.”
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from 0.033 to 0.031 for the males and from 0.034 to 0.033 for the females. Thus, every recent
victory bolsters the odds of winning the current match by 3.1 to 3.3 percentage points. Figure
1 visualizes these findings in a simple graph.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of wins in last 10 matches on chances of winning a match (all other
covariates taken at their mean).
A remarkable conclusion relates to the fact that we find virtually no gender differences for
the hot-hand effect in tennis, supplementing Livingston (2012) who studies professional golf
tours. This finding is even more surprising given the substantial differences between the ATP
and WTA matches in basic summary statistics (see Table 1). The following sections will now
discuss results from further testing this hypothesis.
4.2 Robustness Checks and Extensions
Table 4 displays several alternative specifications of our baseline findings (final columns of Table
3), once again dedicating columns (1) through (4) to the male sample and (5) through (8) to
the WTA data. Columns (1) and (5) now use more recent performance as a measurement for
having a hot hand by just considering the last five Tour matches. Notice that the previous
results are confirmed and magnitudes even increase by about one third towards 0.04 (men) and
0.045 (women). Thus, the last ten matches matter, but the most recent 5 encounters matter
even more. Once again, logit regressions from using ATP and WTA data return the same level
of statistical significance and remarkably similar magnitudes.
The remaining regressions displayed return to using performance of the previous ten matches
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as an indicator for whether a player is currently hot. Specifically, we consider three distinct
subsamples that are intended to address potential heterogeneities within our original data. For
instance, if players have recently entered the professional tour, then current rankings could be
misleading.8 Thus, we repeat our baseline estimation, but only use observations where the
respective player has at least competed in 50 Tour matches. Further, columns (3) and (7)
display results from only using established players ranked 50 or better, whereas columns (4) and
(8) further derive subsamples of players ranked 30 or better. Both of these subsets serve the
purpose of making our sample more homogeneous, ensuring that outliers in terms of ranking
are not driving our results. However, looking at the derived results throughout Table 4 confirms
our initial finding of a sizeable and persistent hot-hand effect, both for male and female tennis
professionals.
Beyond using the number of wins in the past ten encounters, Table 5 moves to a more
restrictive definition of the hot-hand (cold-hand) phenomenon: a pure winning (losing) streak
of the number of consecutively won (lost) matches. The first two columns, respectively, consider
a winning streak of maximum ten matches, whereas the remaining columns incorporate losing
streaks.9 Starting with winning streaks, we once again find strong evidence for the hot-hand
hypothesis, especially when adding the usual control variables. As before, the derived coefficient
from using the male and female data are virtually identical, suggesting that every additional
win in a streak increases the chances to win again by 1.7 percentage points.
Moving to losing streaks, a measurement for the cold-hand phenomenon, we also find strong
evidence. Interestingly, the estimates remain close in magnitude to the ones derived for winning
streaks, indicating that winning streaks are rewarded in a similar way as losing streaks are
punished. In terms of potential gender differences, losing streaks seem to be punished more on
the WTA Tour, where each loss decreases the chances of winning by 2.0 percentage points –
slightly more than the 1.6 percentage points on the ATP Tour.
Overall, however, our robustness checks and extensions confirm our initial finding of a re-
markably similar hot-hand effect for males and females in labor markets that are by design
8As a famous example, John McEnroe, when emerging on the Tour, was asked how he feels about beating all
these better ranked opponents. His response was that he is the best player in the world, but his ranking hasn’t
caught up with him yet.
9Given our basic sample restriction of only using observations where the respective player has at least played
ten Tour matches previously, we limit streaks to ten.
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gender-separated, yet exhibit almost identical payoff schemes. The next section will now consider
further extensions, addressing a potential heterogeneity along the lines of age and experience.
4.3 Age and Experience
Livingston (2012) uses data from professional golf to show that only analyzing hot-hand effects
at the conditional mean can be misleading. Specifically, he finds that the hot-hand effect emerges
particularly for inexperienced golfers on the Nationwide Tour. Although our results up to now
strongly support the existence of a general hot-hand effect, it can be interesting to consider
potential nonlinearities. Given our data, we readily create two variables capturing experience.
Specifically, we use a player’s age at the time of the match, but also her experience, measured as
the time since her first appearance on Tour. For either variable, we then create an interaction
term between the number of matches won recently and the respective experience variable.
Table 6 displays the respective results, dedicating columns (1) and (2) to the male data,
before moving to the female sample in columns (3) and (4). Incorporating age and its interac-
tion term with recent wins produces no statistically relevant coefficients. However, when using
experience rather than age we do find an interesting particularity. Most notably, experience
in general diminishes the chances of success on the ATP Tour, yet has no statistically relevant
impact on the WTA Tour. Related to the hot-hand hypothesis, experience further increases its
importance. This is in stark contrast to Livingston (2012)’s findings that suggest the opposite.
Although the effect is relatively minor in size – ten years of experience and one additional recent
victory raise the odds of winning by one percentage point – the statistical importance of the
effect emerges with force. Notice that we do not find this anomaly for the female data.
Further, Table 7 re-estimates these potential nonlinearities for age and experience using
pure winning and losing streaks. When choosing streaks as a measurement for the hot-hand
hypothesis results are more nuanced. Now we confirm Livingston (2012)’s results, at least for
the male data in column (1): older players are less prone to the hot-hand effect. As for women,
we find the opposite conclusion, although this result remains weak, both in terms of conventional
levels of statistical significance and magnitude in column (5). Overall, the interaction terms in
Table 7 remain mostly insignificant and negligible in terms of size. Thus, the results from
incorporating age and experience into the hot-hand estimation are mixed and do not paint a
14
Table 6: Considering differences by age and experience for hot-hand effect. Results from logit
regressions, where columns (1) – (4) consider data from the Men’s Tour (ATP) and
columns (5) – (8) evaluate data from the Women’s Tour (WTA). Displaying marginal
effects.
Men’s Tour Women’s Tour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of wins in last 10 matches 0.041∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Age -0.002 -0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Age × # of wins in last 10 matches -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Experience -0.005∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Experience × # of wins in last 10 matches 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Rankings, H-2-H variables, Grand Slam, yes yes yes yes
surface, and round FEa
N 57,133 57,133 50,432 50,432
Log lik. -36,410.262 -36,424.084 -31,971.013 -31,975.925
Chi-squared 3,461.252 3,484.515 3,348.277 3,341.877
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aIncludes ranking variables (ranking, ranking squared, opponent’s ranking), H-2-H characteristics
(whether faced opponent before, whether beaten opponent before, from same country), Grand Slam,
surface, and round fixed effects.
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clear picture, especially when compared to our baseline findings and the respective extensions.
With these results in mind, we now move to regressions results addressing the clutch-player
effect.
5 Empirical Findings for the Clutch-Player Phenomenon
Performance in high-pressure situations has long been analyzed not only in the labor literature,
but also in specific sports environments. As pointed out by Dohmen (2008) and Ariely et al.
(2009), large rewards can not only provide motivation and increase effort levels (Lazear, 2000),
but can also paralyze. Applied to tennis, some tournaments are naturally more important than
others. The tennis season reaches its highlights with the four Grand Slam tournaments and we
wish to test whether top players actually do perform well there, i.e., are clutch players, or if
they can be overwhelmed by the pressure – something that is oftentimes referred to as choking
in the sports world.
5.1 Performance at Grand Slam Events
Table 8 estimates the probability of winning a particular match, where we again distinguish
between the male sample in columns (1) through (4) and the female sample in (5) through (8).
To estimate whether top-ranked players perform exceptionally in Grand Slam events, we first
use an interaction term between a dummy for players ranked in the top four and Grand Slams,
while also controlling for both aspects individually. Both in the basic regressions and when
adding our initial set of covariates in columns (2) and (6) the interaction term returns a positive
and statistically powerful coefficient. Taken literally, a top four ATP player is ten percentage
points more likely to win a match at a Grand Slam tournament, as opposed to any other event
throughout the year. The effect emerges as well for females, yet with a smaller magnitude of 7.8
percentage points.
However, using a binary indicator for top four players may still be too general – an arbitrary
cutoff, albeit based on empirical observations (especially on the ATP Tour the top four players
have dominated the recent years almost exclusively). Thus, the remaining columns choose the
most continuous and objective measurement of player quality by incorporating an interaction
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Figure 2: Marginal effects of ranking on winning the match when playing in Grand Slam.
term between a player’s ranking and Grand Slam tournaments. Once again, we find firm support
for the clutch-player hypothesis, both for men and women. With this broader measurement, and
controlling for our additional covariates, an ATP player ranked # 20 is 2.9 percentage points
more likely to win a match at a Grand Slam event than somebody ranked # 120. Interestingly,
the relationship is now stronger for females, with a suggested effect of 4.1 percentage points.
In fact, the regressions results displayed in columns (4) and (8) allow us to graph the marginal
effect of ranking on the probability of winning when playing in a Grand Slam event. The results
are displayed in Figure 2, where we focus on the players ranked in the top 150. Notice that
for females the marginal effect is steeper and a player ranked #1 is 4.3 percentage points more
likely to win in a Grand Slam match than in a match at any other tournament. For males, the
marginal increase in the odds of winning for the best ranked player turn out to be 3.5 percentage
points. Note that this effect is isolating the fact that a player is competing at a Grand Slam
tournament, controlling for rankings and our usual set of covariates.
Further, the lower end of the graph also provides some evidence for the choking hypothesis
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(Ariely et al., 2009), where large payoffs can hamper one’s performance. Although the best
ranked players seem to excel in Grand Slam events, players ranked beyond 118 (males) or 106
(females) actually seem to under-perform in these lucrative situations. Thus, one difference
between top players and other Tour professionals may be the ability to perform their best in
clutch situations.
Table 8 provides firm evidence for the clutch-player effect of top players. Higher prize money,
more prestige, and big stages indeed seem to bring out the best performance in top tennis players.
The following sections consider crucial moments within matches, evaluating whether top players
are more likely to win in final, decisive sets and whether they perform exceptionally well in
tie-breaks, the closest form of deciding a set in tennis.
5.2 Clutch Play within Matches?
Beyond analyzing the most important tournaments, Grand Slams, another way of testing for
clutch-player effects can be found within matches. With the exception of male Grand Slam
events and the Davis Cup, matches are usually decided in a best-of-three format. In other
words, the player who wins two out of three sets advances in the tournament. In this case, a
final, third set presents a win-or-go-home scenario and we would expect top players to prevail
in these situations if the clutch-player effect does exist. In Grand Slam and Davis Cup events
the format is extended to best-of-five sets with the respective scenario occurring in a potential
fifth set.
Table 9 displays regressions from using a subsample of those matches that witnessed a final
and decisive set. Overall, this produces 16,536 observations for the male sample and 15,801
matches on the women’s side. Thus, 29 percent of the men’s matches and 31 percent of the
women’s matches eventually reached a final and decisive set. In this case, the results are less
convincing and the interaction terms of top players (ranked top four; general ranking) with
Grand Slam events produces a coefficient that is not statistically significant on conventional
levels. One exception is provided by the interaction term between ranking and Grand Slams for
males in column (3), but once the usual control variables are added in column (4) statistical
importance vanishes. The respective coefficients for the WTA sample, on the other hand, never
come close to commonly accepted levels of statistical significance.
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Another clutch situation within a match is provided by the ultimate decision within a set:
a tie-break. At a score of 6 to 6 games within a set, the rules prescribe a tie-break, where the
first to seven points wins (point differential of two necessary). In fact, the tie-break could be
considered as the ultimate form of a clutch-play situation within a tennis match.
Table 10 displays results from logit regressions, estimating the probability of winning a tie-
break. Specifically, we derive a subsample from both the male and the female samples that
incorporates those matches that witnessed one tie-break throughout the match. In this case we
code the dependent variable as one if the respective player wins the tie-break and zero otherwise.
The results produce evidence for clutch-play on the men’s side, yet the coefficients from the
female subsample are weaker and do not reach conventional levels of statistical importance.
ATP players ranked in the top four are over eight percentage points more likely to win a tie-
break at a Grand Slam tournament, relative to other, smaller tournaments. This result remains
stable after the inclusion of our set of control variables. Interestingly, the same regression in
the female sample produces a similar coefficient (0.082), but lacks statistical relevance. Thus,
the difference can be found in the statistical precision of our estimation and we indeed note a
much higher standard error in column (6) than in column (2), namely 0.068 versus 0.043. One
explanation could simply be that female superstars are much less likely to reach the tie-break
stages and most sets are decided beforehand. In fact, the respective subsample confirms this
suspicion as 16,398 matches on the male Tour saw one tie-break, whereas only 9,152 matches on
the female Tour did.
Considering a continuous measurement of rankings then confirms this trend. We recover
statistical importance on the ten percent level for males, but not for females. In this case
the distinction is much clearer, as the final and most complete estimation suggests male players
ranked 100 spots better to be 2.2 percentage points more likely to win a tie-break at a Grand Slam
tournament, compared to any other event. For WTA Tour matches the implied coefficient would
suggest an effect of 1.3 percentage points, although this result is not distinguishably different
from zero. Overall, the results from analyzing clutch situations within matches produces less
precise conclusions regarding a potential clutch-player effect.
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6 Conclusion
This paper uses tennis, an individual sport with isolated single-sex labor markets and virtually
identical payoff structures, to analyze potential gender differences in competitive behavior. Our
study allows for three main conclusions.
First, we find strong evidence for the hot-hand and the cold-hand effect. Recent performance
does matter in predicting current outcomes and this result is not only relevant in statistical
terms, but also quite sizeable. For example, having won all previous ten matches increases the
likelihood of winning the current encounter by over 31 to 33 percentage points. This result
is robust to a variety of robustness checks and extensions, confirming and extending Wozniak
(2012)’s findings about men’s and women’s choices to enter professional tennis tournaments
and Livingston (2012) who studies the hot-hand effect in professional golf. In addition, losing
streaks seem to be punished in the same way as winning streaks are rewarded with respect to
the chances of winning the current match.
Second, top players perform strongly at Grand Slam tournaments, arguably the most impor-
tant events for tennis players. We take this finding as evidence for a clutch-player effect as top
players are up to four percentage points more likely to win a given match at a Grand Slam tour-
nament, relative to any other event. This confirms previous findings related to the clutch-player
effect in tennis by Gonza´lez-Dı´az et al. (2012). We also find some evidence for lower-ranked
players performing worse than expected at Grand Slam events, confirming the intuition of large
payoffs being able to paralyze an athlete (Ariely et al., 2009). In fact, the ability to perform well
in important tournaments may be one distinction between top players and the rest of the field
in tennis. In additional estimations, we find that male players are more likely to win tie-breaks
at Grand Slam tournaments, although this result is less convincing in statistical terms.
Third and final, both effects show very little differences across gender. Especially analyzing
the hot-hand effect produces remarkably similar coefficients for the male and female samples
(0.31 versus 0.33). As for the clutch-player effect, top-ranked female players are more likely to
perform well in important matches, if anything.
Overall, our results provide additional information for how women and men may or may not
behave differently in competitive situations. It is important to note that tennis is by design
a labor market where men and women are separated. Thus, it may well be possible that
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gender differences of competitive behavior are more likely to emerge in mixed environments,
as suggested by Gneezy et al. (2003). Nevertheless, sports can provide an interesting laboratory
to study behavior, given its clear labor market structures.
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